

The role of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants regarding the situation of asylum seekers and refugees: reflections on an experience

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The system of Special Procedures of the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (hereinafter ‘the Special Procedures’), which includes Special Rapporteurships, independent experts, and working groups, does not have a mechanism expressly referring to refugees. Hence, it is the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants who, by approximation, and assuming a broad concept of migrant (ie any person in a situation of mobility) addresses the situation of refugees and asylum seekers. It should be mentioned, however, that, with regard to refugees as such, the Special Rapporteur does not often focus specifically on them as a central aspect of his or her mandate. On this basis, I share below some reflections on the main aspects of my recent experience (2017 to 2023) as Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, in relation to asylum seekers and refugees. The examples referenced in this paper are certainly not exhaustive but are illustrative of the ways in which the mandate may engage with issues relating to refugees and asylum seekers.

To begin with, it should be noted that the work of the Special Procedures is undertaken using a variety of international instruments. Unlike the UN Treaty bodies, Special Procedures are not treaty mechanisms and have jurisdiction over all UN States in the exercise of each of their functions (communications and urgent actions addressed to States, thematic and country reports, on site visits, etc.).¹ Special Procedures invoke treaties that the State has ratified or declarations and resolutions that it has signed insofar as they are relevant to the respective situation. One such treaty is the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees

¹ The mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants was originally established by the UN Commission on Human Rights through resolution 1999/44 (27 April 1999) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1999/44. Since then, it has been renewed (first by the Commission and later by the UN Human Rights Council) every three years.

(hereinafter, ‘the Convention’ or ‘the 1951 Convention’).² Its 75th anniversary is a good opportunity to review its impact in the work of the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants.

Although most States have ratified the Convention, there are still many that have not yet done so. In the latter case—as I had occasion to do during my visits to Bangladesh³ and Nepal,⁴ as well as in numerous communications to States—the Special Procedures will resort to those instruments to which the State is a party. Depending on the case or situation, this may include the full range of human rights instruments. These may be instruments of a general nature, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,⁵ the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights⁶ or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁷ Special Procedures can also refer to instruments relating to specific groups, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,⁸ the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,⁹ or the Convention on the Rights of the Child,¹⁰ among others. Special mention should be made of the Convention against Torture,¹¹ the use of which is frequent by Special Procedures, and, importantly for the case of migrants and refugees, applicable not only in situations of immigration detention and other similar situations, but also with regard to the principle of *non-refoulement*, according to which no person can be sent to a State ‘where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture’ (article 3). The Convention on Enforced Disappearances also refers to this principle (article 11.1).¹² Of course, the International Convention for the Protection of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families¹³ is also used by the Special Procedures, although its application is limited, as less than a third of UN States have ratified it, being the human rights instrument with the lowest level of ratification of that organization.

Without prejudice to the importance of the above-mentioned instruments, when the State has ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the task of the international human rights body becomes less complex in legal terms. This is because the provisions of this Convention expressly refer to refugees, thus avoiding the need to carry out

² Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137.

³ UNHRC, ‘Visit to Bangladesh: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales’ (22 May 2023) UN Doc A/HRC/53/26/Add.3. In this visit, as in the one to Nepal, a call was made to ratify the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

⁴ UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on his mission to Nepal from 29 January to 5 February 2018’ (18 April 2018) UN Doc A/HRC/38/41/Add.1.

⁵ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.

⁶ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.

⁷ UNGA Res 217 A (III) (10 December 1948).

⁸ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13.

⁹ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195.

¹⁰ Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.

¹¹ Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85.

¹² International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010) 2716 UNTS 3.

¹³ International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (adopted 18 December 1990, entered into force 1 July 2003) 2220 UNTS 3.

sometimes complex hermeneutical work to apply other instruments to the situation of refugees. In any case, when a State has ratified the Convention the Special Procedures will additionally invoke, in a complementary manner, the other relevant instruments.

On the basis described, this commentary will summarily address some key challenges for the protection of the human rights of refugees, such as access to asylum, expulsions and third country processing, immigration detention and due process, and future challenges such as climate mobility and the criminalization of solidarity and of defenders. All these issues are relevant for the effectiveness of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

1. Access to asylum

During my tenure as Special Rapporteur, I was able to observe the widespread presence and expansion of mixed migratory flows in different regions of the world. Unlike in the past, the human mobility process now often includes economic migrants, refugees, actual or potential asylum seekers, and people who could receive other forms of international protection. This has made both the type of appropriate response by States and the task of international human rights organizations more complex and is a key issue for the effectiveness of the Refugee Convention,

One of the most serious problems I observed as Special Rapporteur was the growing global trend of hindering access to the right to seek asylum. Among the most common obstacles—which I addressed in two thematic reports,¹⁴ in country reports,¹⁵ and in numerous communications to States¹⁶—are ‘pushbacks’, which are summary actions that prevent entry into the territory of a country or are conducted to expel persons from it. Although pushbacks sometimes involve the use of force,¹⁷ its presence is not a requirement for certain measures to be considered pushbacks. It is important to add that the practice of ‘pushbacks’ not only violates the right to seek asylum, but can also lead to other human rights violations, such as, for example, and depending on the case, the right to life, physical and mental integrity, and access to justice, to name but a few. Due to their very nature, pushbacks prevent an individual examination of each person’s situation, whether or not violence exists. And in the context of mixed migratory flows, this means that it is not possible to determine if the person is an economic migrant, an asylum seeker, or even a refugee. The absence of an individual examination of each case exposes individuals to potential *refoulement*, and violates the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as well as a number of international human rights instruments.

¹⁴ UNHRC, ‘Report on means to address the human rights impact of pushbacks of migrants at land and at sea: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants’ (12 May 2021) UN Doc A/HRC/47/30; UNHRC, ‘Human Rights violations at international borders: trends, prevention and accountability’ (26 April 2022) UN Doc A/HRC/50/31.

¹⁵ For instance, UNHRC, ‘Visit to Belarus: Report by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales’ (18 May 2023) UN Doc A/HRC/53/26/Add.2; UNHRC, ‘Visit to Poland: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales’ (21 April 2023) UN Doc A/HRC/53/26/Add.1; UNHRC, ‘Visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants’ (12 May 2020) UN Doc A/HRC/44/42/Add.2, paras 64-68 (making reference to pushbacks from Croatia).

¹⁶ For example, UN Special Procedures, ‘UA CHL 3/21’ (7 May 2021) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26399>> accessed 1 April 2026; UN Special Procedures, ‘UA MYS 2/21’ (19 February 2021) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=26052>> accessed 1 April 2026; UN Special Procedures, ‘AL SAU 9/22’ (3 October 2022) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27562>> accessed 1 April 2026.

¹⁷ ‘Report on pushbacks’ (n 14) para 62.

Although it is not possible to determine with certainty how many persons on the move in mixed migratory flows are asylum seekers, conclusions can be drawn from observation. An illustrative case is that of people who try to enter Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea and who manage to avoid the large number of ‘pushback’ operations that are carried out there. A very high percentage of these people apply for asylum once they arrive in Europe, which suggests that those who are prevented from entering due to pushbacks and other non-entrée measures have been prevented from making such a request. Many of these pushback operations are outsourced to third states, for example, through agreements between European countries and neighbouring countries, some of which do not even meet the criteria of ‘safe third country’;¹⁸ an example is the agreement between Italy and Libya. In such cases, as long as the ‘outsourcing country’ is aware of the practice of the ‘outsourced country’, all states involved are internationally responsible for the pushbacks.

2. Expulsions and third country processing

In addition to pushbacks, an increasing number of States frequently practice other forms of collective expulsions. These are deportations that are not preceded by an individual examination of the case of each person.¹⁹ The main purpose of an individual examination is precisely to determine whether the person should be recognized as a refugee under the 1951 Convention, or whether he or she should enjoy another form of international protection. These collective expulsions are sometimes carried out without any intention of giving even an appearance of legality on the part of the expelling State. In other cases, although apparently dressed up as adherence to the norms, they are in reality preceded by a formalistic and superficial review of the cases, without such review conforming to the standards of a genuine individual examination. Collective expulsions often violate the principle of *non-refoulement*, by not taking into account whether or not the country to which the person is expelled (whether the State of which he or she is a national or a third State) is safe or the life or personal integrity of the expelled person would be at risk.²⁰

During my tenure as Special Rapporteur, I had to confront the practice of collective expulsions by many countries. In fact, a phenomenon I was able to observe was an expansion of this practice to States that previously did not engage in it or did so infrequently, as in the case of Latin American countries. The most serious situation among the countries of the region is that of the Dominican Republic, which has taken the practice of collective expulsions to the extreme of detaining pregnant migrant women on their way out of hospitals when visiting for medical appointments and then deporting them.²¹

Another trend that is becoming increasingly widespread at the global level to hinder the right to seek asylum is the so-called ‘externalization of borders’, which I also addressed as Special Rapporteur through numerous communications to States and other

¹⁸ Mark Akkerman, ‘Expanding the Fortress: The policies, the profiteers and the people shaped by EU’s border externalisation programme’ (Transnational Institute and Stop Wapenhandel 2018) <<https://www.tni.org/en/publication/expanding-the-fortress>> accessed 1 April 2026.

¹⁹ ECHR, ‘Factsheet: Collective expulsions of aliens’ (October 2024) <https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/fs_collective_expulsions_eng#:~:text=%E2%80%9CCollective%20expulsion%E2%80%9D%20%3D%20any%20measure,individual%20alien%20of%20the%20group> accessed 1 April 2026.

²⁰ ‘Report on pushbacks’ (n 14) para 64.

²¹ OHCHR, ‘Dominican Republic: UN experts condemn detention and deportation of pregnant and postpartum Haitian women’ (12 September 2023) <<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/09/dominican-republic-un-experts-condemn-detention-and-deportation-pregnant-and>> accessed 1 April 2026.

initiatives, and which has recently been the subject of a report by the Office of the current Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants.²² Under this practice, destination countries seek agreements - sometimes through pressure and sometimes through financial compensation - with other States so that the latter take responsibility for asylum seekers, who must remain in their territory for the duration of the processing of their application. This is what happens, for example, between the United States and Mexico,²³ between Australia and some Asia-Pacific States (such as Papua New Guinea until some time ago and currently with Nauru),²⁴ and between the European Union (EU) or countries that belong to it and third states, such as the EU with Turkey, Italy with Albania, and several initiatives, such as the United Kingdom's with Rwanda (which was recently discontinued).²⁵

These agreements make the exercise of the right to seek asylum much more complex. By preventing potential asylum seekers from entering or remaining in the territory of the State where they intend to apply for asylum, the likelihood of such status being recognized is seriously diminished, as they lack adequate access to justice. Depending on the arrangement in place, they may be subject to procedural irregularities in the host country, or find it much more difficult to participate in the asylum procedure from a distance. In addition, conditions in the State in which a person is forced to remain while the asylum application is being processed may give rise to its own human rights and security concerns, which is precisely what the institution of asylum and the right to seek asylum seeks to avoid.

A less explicit modality of externalization that still has a serious negative impact on the right to seek asylum and the effectiveness of the Convention is the establishment of barriers to human mobility by some countries because of the influence of others, usually from the Global North. For example, during an official visit to Niger,²⁶ I learned first-hand about the EU-supported initiatives undertaken by Niger to prevent free transit from the south into the Sahara Desert, so that human mobility flows do not go to Libya and from there try to reach EU countries. As these are mixed flows, it is impossible to determine with certainty what percentage is made up of potential asylum seekers, but it is clear that many people are in this situation, thus preventing them from exercising their right to seek asylum by such measures of 'containment'.

The overall assessment that I can make regarding the state of the institution of asylum based on my experience as Special Rapporteur is that it is going through a phase of very serious deterioration at the global level. This, to the point that one can speak of a serious distortion of this right, to the extent that it is largely losing its effectiveness. The 75th anniversary of the Refugee Convention provides an opportunity to raise public awareness about the ongoing deterioration of the institution of asylum and the need to confront this serious situation.

²² UNGA, 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Gehad Madi: Externalization of migration governance and its effect on the human rights of migrants' (4 August 2025) UN Doc A/80/302.

²³ UN Special Procedures, 'OL USA 4/2019' (7 March 2019) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24381>> accessed 1 April 2026.

²⁴ UN Special Procedures, 'AL AUS 4/2019' (2 April 2019) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24482>> accessed 1 April 2026.

²⁵ UN Special Procedures, 'OL GBR 9/22' (1 July 2022) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=27407>> accessed 1 April 2026.

²⁶ UNHRC, 'Visit to the Niger: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants' (16 May 2019) UN Doc A/HRC/41/38/Add.1, paras 29-38.

3. Restrictions in-country: immigration detention and due process

A number of the state practices reflected on so far concern efforts to prevent access to a state's territory, or move people elsewhere, through expulsion or third country processing measures. Another relevant issue that I observed in many countries during my tenure concerned the treatment of refugees and migrants in-country. This included the increased practice of immigration detention, which affects many asylum seekers, as well as other people in a situation of mobility. This extends in many countries to child immigration detention. In a report prepared by the Rapporteurship in 2020, we found that at that time 77 States continued to practice child immigration detention.²⁷ A series of UN human rights mechanisms, such as the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, the Committee on Migrant Workers, and the Committee on the Rights of the Child, among others, have established that child immigration detention is a violation of international law, as it is never in the best interests of the child.²⁸ During the preparation of the Global Compact on Migration, in which the Rapporteurship actively participated, the prohibition of child immigration detention was established in one of the drafts circulated publicly, but in the final version only the commitment to work to end this practice was adopted.²⁹ Although insufficient, as it is an instrument signed by the States, it was a relevant step forward.

Also, in relation to immigration detention, a situation that was especially shocking in some of my country visits was the discrimination that is imbued in the decision to detain or not each asylum seeker. In my visit to Poland,³⁰ which took place in July 2022, five months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, I noted the open differentiation in the Polish government's treatment of people fleeing Ukraine from those fleeing armed conflicts in the Middle East. Indeed, while in the case of those escaping from Ukraine not only was immigration detention not used, but they were incorporated into a reception programme - established at the European level - for their maintenance and social integration. Conversely, in the case of those who came from the Middle East, immigration detention was almost automatic. This was also reflected in what I observed during my official visit to Hungary,³¹ which practices large-scale immigration detention and in very harsh conditions - at that time in the so-called Transit Zones - with respect to people from the Middle East. At the same time, the country had adopted a bilateral agreement with Ukraine (before the Russian invasion of 2022) for the regular migration to Hungary of people from that country. Discrimination on racial and/or religious grounds is evident in such situations.

As a positive note of impact in this regard, it should be noted that, as a result of a series of initiatives by international organizations, which culminated in a judgment by the European Court of Justice,³² the harshness of the conditions of migrant detention in Hungary was attenuated, with the closure of the Transit Zones in that country. However, the practice of immigration detention continues to be widespread.

In addition to the various obstacles mentioned in accessing state territory to claim asylum, once arrived, there is the significant issue of delays in the processing of asylum

²⁷ UNGA, 'Ending immigration detention of children and seeking adequate reception and care for them' (20 July 2020) UN Doc A/75/183, para.12.

²⁸ *ibid.*, para 13.

²⁹ UNGA, Res 73/195 (19 December 2018) UN Doc A/RES/73/195, Objective 13, h).

³⁰ 'Visit to Poland' (n 15).

³¹ UNHRC, 'Visit to Hungary: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants' (11 May 2020) UN Doc A/HRC/44/42/Add.1, paras 22-34.

³² Case C-808/18 *Commission v Hungary* [2020] ECLI:EU:C:2020:1029.

applications in many countries, the increasing complexity of the requirements to obtain refugee status and lack of access to justice and due process. These are all obstacles that I was able to observe as Special Rapporteur. As a result, many persons who, under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, should have been recognized as refugees, remain in an irregular migratory situation. In South America, a case that stands out in recent years is that of Venezuelan human mobility, which, despite the humanitarian crisis that has caused a massive flight of people from that country, has very low rates of recognition of refugee status in the main countries of destination (South American countries, the United States, and Spain).³³ The situation is aggravated because many people from Venezuela must overcome numerous barriers to regularize their immigration status. As noted in a report by the Office of the Rapporteur on Migratory Regularization, of the main destination countries for Venezuelans only Colombia has undertaken a broad regularization initiative for the Venezuelan population.³⁴

4. Future challenges: climate, criminalization of solidarity and defending human rights in the modern age

As we reflect on the challenges facing the international refugee regime, it is important to recognize the increasing importance of the impact of climate change on human mobility. The Office of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has published two reports on the subject: one in 2012 and another in 2022, both presented to the UN General Assembly.³⁵ They call on the international community to establish a normative structure to deal with this situation, which is rapidly increasing in severity and affects all regions of the planet. In relation to the issue of forced migration and climate change, one of the aspects reviewed in the 2022 report is that the figure of the ‘climate refugee’ can be considered to exist under current international standards, including the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This is an issue that has not yet been settled by international organizations and on which there are disparate criteria among States. The answer is clearer in the context of Africa and Latin America, since the existence of climate refugees can be deduced from provisions of the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa³⁶ and the Cartagena Declaration,³⁷ respectively, when they refer to ‘events seriously disturbing public order’ and to generalized violence as grounds for refugee status.

The 2022 report further states that while not all situations of people on the move caused by climate change could qualify as refugees under the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol solely for that reason, ‘[t]he adverse effects of

³³ According to UNHCR, as of December 2025, of a total of nearly 7.9 million Venezuelans who have left their country, only about 395,000 have been recognized as refugees. See UNHCR, ‘Venezuela Situation’ (December 2025) <<https://www.unhcr.org/emergencies/venezuela-situation>> accessed 1 April 2026.

³⁴ UNHRC, ‘How to expand and diversify regularization mechanisms and programmes to enhance the protection of the human rights of migrants: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants’ (20 April 2023) UN Doc A/HRC/53/26, para 49.

³⁵ UNGA, ‘Human Rights of Migrants: Notes by the Secretary-General’ (13 August 2012) UN Doc A/67/299; UNGA, ‘The impact of climate change on the human rights of migrants: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants’ (19 July 2022) UN Doc A/77/189.

³⁶ OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (adopted 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 January 1974) 1001 UNTS 45.

³⁷ Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, ‘Cartagena Declaration on Refugees’ (Cartagena, Colombia, 19-22 November 1984).

climate change should be interpreted within a broader socio-political context and it should be considered how such a context can exacerbate pre-existing discrimination, persecution and marginalization, thereby reinforcing claims for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention'.³⁸

Finally, it is important to refer to the situation of the defenders of the human rights of people on the move. As I observed during my tenure as Rapporteur, different kinds of obstacles, including criminalization, threats, or harassment by State authorities or by private actors with tolerance from the State, and various forms of restrictions on their activities, have increased significantly. In the report prepared by the Office of the Rapporteur after my official visit to Belarus, in which we were unable to meet with any human rights defenders, we pointed out that in the case of that country this is part of a more general framework of serious restrictions on civil society.³⁹ During the visit to Hungary,⁴⁰ we were able to verify the widespread belligerence of government authorities towards human rights defenders of migrants and the criminalization of their activities. During the visit to Poland, we denounced the limitations imposed on human rights monitoring work in the area near the border with Belarus.⁴¹

Through numerous joint communications from many Special Procedures to States - many of which resulted in press releases - we addressed the restrictions and criminalization of asylum seeker defenders. This became recurrent in the case of Italy, which during the six years of my mandate was the subject of repeated requests in this regard by the Office of the Special Rapporteur. This, either because the defenders were criminally prosecuted under the assumption that they practiced human trafficking or facilitated illegal immigration,⁴² because their rescue ships were intercepted,⁴³ or because the disembarkation of those that managed to reach port was prevented, among other situations.

5. Conclusion

The above mentioned are some of the initiatives carried out by the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants in relation to refugees and asylum seekers during the period in question. As can be seen, there are several ways in which the Rapporteurship can address the situation of refugees, forced migrants, and others on the move. To this end, the Office of the Rapporteur engages with the 1951 Convention when it is applicable and the State has ratified it, as well as to the broader array of relevant international human rights instruments. The impact of these tasks varies, depending on the political context and other factors, but, of course, without the existence of the Office of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants and the other Special Procedures, the situation of refugees and asylum seekers would be much more difficult.

The 75th anniversary of the Refugee Convention provides an important opportunity to enhance its visibility and role regarding a wide range of people in mobility whose human rights protection is nowadays under serious menace. In particular, the right to seek asylum is under severe stress. This ongoing situation makes it increasingly relevant to adopt

³⁸ 'The impact of climate change on the human rights of migrants' (n 35) para 67.

³⁹ 'Visit to Belarus' (n 15) para 35.

⁴⁰ 'Visit to Hungary' (n 31) paras 54-55.

⁴¹ 'Visit to Poland' (n 15).

⁴² UN Special Procedures, 'AL ITA 6/2019' (12 July 2019) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24702>> accessed 1 April 2026.

⁴³ UN Special Procedures, 'AL ITA 5/2020' (1 October 2020) <<https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=25526>> accessed 1 April 2026.

initiatives to strengthen the Convention's effectiveness and to encourage additional States to ratify it.

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